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The Bipartisan Patient Protection Act: Greater

Liability on Managed Care Plans
Urura W. Mayers'
I. INTRODUCTION

Recently, both the Senate and House of Representatives passed bills that
comprise the Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001.' The ability for
either bill to go into effect depends largely on its ability to endure HouseSenate conference committee discussions, as well as President George W.
Bush's staunch refusal to place his signature on a bill that would ultimately
serve as a boon for trial lawyers.
Proponents of the Senate bill are considered to be in favor of consumer
protection, while proponents of the House bill seem willing to limit such
protection. The House bill is more favored by President George W. Bush
because it negates advantageous opportunities for trial lawyers, but a
conference committee will work to develop a compromise bill that can be
sent to the President. If this compromise bill is passed, it will serve
generally as the Patients' Bill of Rights. Even though a compromise bill is
essentially a settlement of differences by mutual concessions, there will
always be a feeling that one side's views are more incorporated than the
other's.
This Article will provide a look into the remedies made available under
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both the House and Senate bills to participants, beneficiaries, and enrollees.
This Article will also discuss the development of managed care entities,
particularly health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"), and liabilities
that have been assessed against these organizations in terms of state claims
filed under state tort law. A general overview of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA") 2 and recent actions fostered to amend it
will be addressed due to its preemptive power.3

II. MANAGED CARE PROGRESSION
Traditionally, medical care services in America have been provided on a
"fee-for-service" basis. Under this type of arrangement, a patient makes a
payment to the provider selected for the services provided. Likewise, if the
patient had insurance and the provider was willing, the provider submitted
the patient's bill to the insurance plan for reimbursement subject to the
terms of the insurance agreement. Therefore, under "a fee-for-service
[arrangement], a [provider's] financial incentive is to provide more care,
not less, so long as payment is forthcoming." 5 "The check on this incentive
is a [provider's] obligation to 6exercise reasonable medical skill and
judgment in the patient's interest."
"Beginning in the late 1960's, insurers and others developed new models
for health-care delivery, including HMOs. ' ' 7 In turn, HMOs developed
from managed care, theories of "[reducing] costs and [providing] the best
value for both the [provider] and the patient." 8 Generally, an HMO is "any
of a variety of types of health plans that contract with a defined group of
providers (usually on a capitated basis) to provide health care to a defined
population.'9
Capitation involves providing "a monthly payment per enrollee
regardless of what care the individual actually receives. "' 0 "The HMO thus
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (2000).
3. This preemptive power operates generally against health care plans that are provided
through an employer, or that are self-insured.
4. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218 (2000).
5. Id.
6. Id.at 215.
7. Id.at218.
8. Managed Care Organization ("MCO")isa broad category of health plans, ranging
from simple preauthorization plans to HMOs. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 308 (3d ed. 1997).
9. National Conference of State Legislatures, Insurance and Managed Care, Frequently
Asked Questions, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/faqmgdcare.htm (articulatng the different types of managed care plans).
10. Id. (discussing the different types of managed care plans, including the definition of
capitated price).
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assumes the financial risk of providing the benefits promised: if a
participant [or] [enrollee] never gets sick, the HMO keeps the money
regardless, and if a participant [or] [enrollee] becomes expensively ill, the
HMO is responsible for the treatment agreed upon even if its cost exceeds
the participant's [or] [enrollee's] premiums.""
"Hence, in an HMO
system, a [provider's] financial interest lies in providing less care, not
more."' 2 "The check on this influence (like that on the converse, fee-forservice incentive) is the professional obligation to provide covered services
with a reasonable degree of skill and judgment in the patient's interest."' 3
An HMO may act as both the provider and the insurer.14 There are two
main types of HMOs.' 5 The first type, the staff model, hires providers
directly to work out of its facilities.' 6 The second type, the group model,
contracts with provider groups to provide health care at discounted rates. 17
In order to encourage the development of HMOs as an alternative to
traditional methods of health care delivery, Congress enacted the Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 ("HMOA").' 8 The law fostered the
development of HMOs by offering loans and loan guarantees to those
wishing to establish and operate federally qualified HMOs, and for grants
for such things as the training of HMO administrators.' 9 The law further
provided for the preemption of restrictive state laws that might frustrate the
operation of federally qualified HMOs. 0
There were other managed care entities established as substitutions to
conventional systems of health care to reorganize risk assumption and
medical decision-making. 2' Two of the managed care models that evolved
included preferred provider organizations ("PPOs") and point-of-service
("POS") plans.22 PPOs are "health plan[s] that offer full or high coverage
11. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 218-219.
12. Id. at 219.
13. Id.
14. Peggy L. Noble, The Mismanagement of Managed Care Legislation: A Comparison
Between the Democratic-ProposedPatients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998 and the RepublicanProposedPatient ProtectionAct of 1998, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 685, 690 (2000).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 300e (2000).
19. William F. Megna, Patients' Bill Of Rights - Be Careful What You Ask For,211 N.J.
LAWYER 34, 34 (2001) (examining the competing federal proposals and the effect of the
Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, if it becomes law).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (2000).
21. See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 9.
22. Christine Lockhart, The Safest Care is to Deny Care: Implications of Corporate
Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance on HMO Liability in Texas, 41 S.
TEX. L. REv. 621, 626 (2000).
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for a defined panel of providers (who accept discounted fees) and more
limited coverage for care outside of the plan. 23 A POS, on the other hand,
is a "hybrid plan with features of managed care and insurance [,] [thereby
making it a] [t]raditional HMO that also partially reimburses care received
outside the plan." 24
Although utilization review is a driving force, HMOs and other managed
care organizations ("MCOs") primarily use two ways to encourage
providers to engage in "cost-conscious decision making., 25 One way is
26
2
through capitation. The second way is by salary2 7
Salary exists when an HMO hires a group of providers as employees or
contracts with a provider group, and each provider receives a salary for
providing health care to a group of individuals in a particular health plan.28
Both of these payment plans discourage providers from spending more time
with their patients, because there is no additional compensation available
for doing so.
Further, use of ancillary health care services like
experimental treatments, diagnostic test, and referrals are not encouraged.3 °
This is because there is often a certain amount of money set aside for these
services, and anything remaining goes to the provider as a bonus.3'
These payment arrangements have, therefore, either directly or indirectly
impacted providers' decision-making regarding their patients and their
patients' medical care needs. A great deal of patients are enrolled in health
plans where providers have limited, denied, or prolonged access to
necessary treatment and/or provided substandard treatment.32 Many of
these patients were injured and sought recourse in state courts.33
Nevertheless, almost all of the plaintiffs' complaints have been removed to
district courts because defendant-HMOs realize that ERISA34 preemption
has the effect of reducing liability that could be imposed on them."
23. See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 9.
24. Lockhart, supra note 22.
25. Robert J. Herrington, Herdrich v. Pegram: ERISA FiduciaryLiability and Physician
Incentives to Deny Care,71 U. COLO. L. REv. 715, 718 (2000).
26. See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 9.
27. Id.
28. Herrington, supra note 25.
29. Id. at 718.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 718-719. This type of incentive system was the issue at stake in Pegram, 530
U.S. at 211.
32. See generally Herrington, supra note 25.
33. Miles J. Zaremski & Bruce C. Nelson, Liability Exposure Facing Managed Care
Organizations,LEGAL MEDICINE, 563 (2001) (discussing liability exposure facing managed
care organizations).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (2000).
35. See Zaremski & Nelson, supra note 33, at 572.
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III. ERISA OVERVIEW OPERATION
Almost simultaneously with the HMOA, Congress enacted ERISA.3 6 It
was effectuated in response to growing concern that employers who
sponsored pension and welfare programs were not supervising plan assets
accordingly, thereby threatening the availability of those assets for plan
beneficiaries, enrollees, and participants when needed.37 Since Congress
has blotted out almost all state law on the subject of pensions, a complaint
about pensions rests on federal law no matter what label is attached by its
author.38 Therefore, this ERISA overview will concern the employee
welfare-benefit plan portion of such programs. An employee welfarebenefit plan or welfare plan is defined as one that provides to employees
"medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability [or] death" whenever these benefits are
provided "through the purchase of insurance or otherwise." '3 9

One of the principal purposes of ERISA is to standardize the
administration of plans subject to the law, regardless of the diversity of
health care delivery systems.40 By enacting ERISA, Congress hoped to
simplify employee benefit administration by preventing plan administrators
from working with numerous types of state laws.'
In this respect,
employers and other plan sponsors, acting under ERISA, have greater
flexibility to determine plan provisions.42 By enacting ERISA, Congress
shielded qualifying ERISA plans from inconsistent state regulatory schemes
that could increase inefficiency and potentially cause benefit levels to be
reduced because benefit dollars would have had to be diverted. 3 In order to
advance standardization in plan administration and available remedies,
Congress drafted the ERISA preemption clause in extremely expansive

36. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (2000).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000). See generally Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption
and Regulation of Managed Healthcare: The Casefor Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. &
MED. 251 (1997); Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation Under
ERISA, 62 IOWA L. REv. 57 (1976).
38. Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that suit
based on difference between pension promised by contract and pension established by plan
"relates to" pension plan for purposes of ERISA preemption).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
40. Id. § 1144(a) (stating that the ERISA preemption clause preempts "any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan").
41. See Robert L. Roth, Recent Developments Concerning the Effect of ERISA
Preemption on Tort Claims Against Employers, Insurers, Health Plan Administrators,
Managed Care Entities, and Utilization Review Agents, 8 HEALTH LAWYER 3.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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terms."
A literal interpretation of the "relates to" language was advanced by
almost all of the earlier case law, including Supreme Court decisions.45 For
instance, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a "state law 'relates to' an
employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
connection with or reference to such plan., 46 The Supreme Court
repeatedly indicated that the "relates to" clause should be interpreted
broadly 47
.
The Supreme Court, while giving great deference to the statutory
language "relates to," has failed to indicate that all state law actions are
preempted under ERISA. Consequently, in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, the
Court reasoned "[s]ome state actions may affect an employee benefit plan
in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the
law 'relates to' the plan., 48 The Supreme Court, in 1995, began to define
parameters for what laws "relate to" a benefit plan in the case of
Travelers.49 The Court observed that "if 'relates to' were taken to extend
the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes
preemption would never run its course, for really, universally, relations stop
no where."5 ° Thus, the ERISA preemption issue becomes a question of
where to draw the line." The Court stated that in order to draw that line and
determine whether a law has a connection with an ERISA plan, it must look
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
45. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (finding that "a law 'relates
to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan").
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (holding that state
lawsuit asserting improper processing of claim for benefits under ERISA-regulated plan was
preempted by federal law where state common-law cause of action did not regulate
insurance, within meaning of saving clause in ERISA preemption provision, and there was
clear expression of congressional intent that ERISA's civil enforcement scheme be
exclusive); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990) (finding that ERISA preempted
application of Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law to self-funded
health care plan); Ingersoll-Rand, Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990) (reasoning
that ERISA preempted the employee's state law wrongful discharge claim because of an
allegation that his discharge was based on his employer's desire to avoid making
contributions to his pension fund).
48. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21.
49. N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 649 (1995) (holding that a New York state law requiring hospitals to collect surcharges
from certain health maintenance organizations as well as from patients whose commercial
insurance coverage was purchased by an employee health care plan was not preempted since
the statute did not affect the administration of the benefit or bear the requisite "connection
with" an ERISA plan so as to trigger preemption).
50. Id. at 655.
51. Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544, 547 (S.D. Ill. 1994).
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to the objectives of the ERISA statute "as a guide to the scope of the state
law that Congress" intended to preempt. 2
The ERISA preemption provision, therefore, is not absolute. Coverage is
not to be construed "to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any
State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities."" Thus, the
insurance industry, traditionally regulated by the states, is not preempted by
ERISA.54 The insurance savings clause language provides an exception to
ERISA's expansive preemption." Specifically, ERISA does not preempt
state laws that regulate insurance even if those laws otherwise "relate to"
an ERISA plan.56
The exception for insurance regulation is itself limited by the provision
that an employee welfare-benefit plan may not "be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer.., or be engaged in the business of
insurance .... "s Therefore, states may not impose insurance regulation on
ERISA self-funded benefit programs by cloaking it as insurance. 8
Companies may choose to self-insure themselves, rather than seek out other
health insurance coverage. 9 These employers are regulated by ERISA and
are not deemed insurance companies under ERISA, so state law remains
inapplicable to these plans. 60
Just as states cannot regulate an employee benefit plan by labeling it
insurance, neither can an insurance program avoid state regulation by
calling itself an employee benefit plan. 6' The common elements of an
ERISA self-funded program that distinguish it from an insured program
include: 1) the existence of an ERISA-qualified employer who promises to
provide to employees a benefit defined in the plan, 2) the employer
retaining ultimate liability for the "losses" covered under the plan-this
employer specifically retains liability even if the employer transfers some
financial risk to another party, 3) no direct contract between the employee
and any other person other than the employer relative to the securing of
covered benefits; in other words, there is no privity of contract between the
employee and any third party who may have agreed, on behalf of an
52. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) (savings clause).
54. Bridget S. Kenney, Comment, Chipping Away at the ERISA Shield: Managed Care
Accountability and the Fifth Circuit's Decision in Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't
of Ins., 85

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

MARQ.

L. REv. 481, 485 (2001).

29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) (savings clause).
See id.
Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000) (deemer clause).
Kenney, supra note 54.
Id.
Id.
See Bell v. Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977).
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employer, to assume certain risk of loss, and 4) a benefit program not
marketed to the general public.62
Therefore, generally, whether a state law is preempted by ERISA
typically involves a three-step inquiry. 63 First, does the law "relate to" an
ERISA plan? 64 Second, is it protected from preemption by existing as a law
that regulates insurance, banking, or securities? 6 Finally, is the particular66
plan at issue self-insured and thereby excluded from state insurance laws?
The preemption issue hinges upon whether the state law involved "relates
to" the ERISA plan.
AVAILABLE REMEDIES
ERISA creates not only uniformity of operation, but also uniformity with
respect to the remedies available to persons denied health insurance or
certain benefits associated with the plan. ERISA contains sections that
outline both civil and criminal penalties for violating the law's provisions.67
Civil sanctions include injunctive and equitable relief, including the right to
specific performance, as well as other relief, specifically enumerated in the
statute.68 Criminal sanctions include fines of up to five thousand dollars or
a year in jail for individuals, and up to one hundred thousand dollars in all
other cases.69
Under section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 70 an individual may assert a civil
claim to recover benefits under the plan, enforce rights under the plan, or
clarify rights for future benefits under the plan. 7' Thus, ERISA plan
participants can sue their plan in state courts of competent jurisdiction and
district courts of the United States, since these courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the state courts, if there is a dispute over benefits.
Further, the participant may obtain an injunction against the plan and

62. See, e.g., American Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997); Bell,
437 F. Supp. at 382.
63.

BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 418,

421 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing how the three-step inquiry is used in varying degrees by most,
but not all, courts).
64. Roth, supra note 41, at 3.
65. Id.
66. Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA and Managed Care: The Law Abhors a Vacuum, 29 J.
HEALTH & Hosp. L. 268, 270 (1996).
67. Megna, supra note 19, at 35.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
69. Id. § 1131.
70. Id. § 1132.
71. Id. § 1132 (a)(1)(B).
72. Id. § 1132(c).
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receive attorney's fees.73

ERISA imposes minimal conditions on employees' benefit plans, and
thus, provides few remedies for employees who are ill served by their
health plans.74 Further, ERISA preempts a wide range of state laws and
remedies intended to protect health plan beneficiaries, often leaving
beneficiaries without legal protection from health plan abuses.75 Once in
federal court, the most plaintiffs can recover is the cost of the care denied to
them.76

As a result, individuals under an ERISA plan are limited to the remedies,
benefits, and enforcement of rights outlined in that specific plan.77 Hence,
no punitive or extra contractual damages are allowed, and suits for
wrongful death, personal injury, or other claims for consequential damages
caused by improper refusal of care or coverage by an insurer or utilization
reviewer are preempted. 7' This is because they pray for relief not
enumerated in the statute. 79 As case law on this subject continues to evolve,
many courts, both state and federal, have taken the position that, as to
traditional areas of state concern (like tort actions for malpractice), damage
actions still are permissible. 8°
IV. HMO LIABILITY PREDICATED ON STATE LAW TORT CLAIMS
Were it not for ERISA preemption, the choice of tort or contract would
be significant primarily with respect to the cause of action, remedy
available, proof required, statute of limitations, and similar practical
considerations.8 ' Without ERISA preemption, it is fair to say that all
managed care organizations would be subject to state common law liability
to their patients, as are other insurers and corporations 2 Today's debate
over managed care liability arises because of ERISA's preemption of state

73.
74.

Id.

75.

Id.

FURROW, supra note 63, at 419.

76. Linda A. Johnson, Parents Sue HMO in Baby's Death: N.J. Case Seen as Potential
Precedent in Insurer'sAccountability, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2000, at A2.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).

78.
79.
80.

See Megna, supra note 19, at 36.
29 U.S.C. §§ I 132(a)(1)(B) (2000), 1132(a)(3) (2000).
Megna, supra note 19, at 36.

81. Wendy K. Mariner, Slouching Toward Managed Care Liability: Reflections On
Doctrinal Boundaries, ParadigmShifts, and Incremental Reform, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
253, 260 (2001).
82. Wendy K. Mariner, Liability for Managed Care Decisions: The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Uneven Playing Field, 86 AM. J. OF PUB.
HEALTH 863 (1996).
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common law actions in certain cases."
One of the pioneering cases that attempted to impose liability by
asserting common-law breach of contract and tort claims against an
insurance company that issued an employer's group insurance policy was
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.8 In Pilot Life, the plaintiff, Dedeaux,
injured his back in an employment-related accident." His employer, Entex,
had a long-term disability employee benefit plan established by purchasing
a group insurance policy from the defendant, Pilot Life Insurance Co.86
Although the plaintiff sought permanent disability benefits, the defendant
terminated his benefits after two years. Three years thereafter, the
plaintiff's benefits were reinstated and terminated by defendant several
times. In reaching its holding, the Court conducted a detailed ERISA
analysis of the savings clause and the deemer clause.87
Furthermore, the Court opined, "[t]he question whether a certain state
action is preempted by federal law is one of congressional intent., 88 "The
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.' ' 9 The Court, therefore,
held that since there was no dispute that the common law causes of action
asserted in the plaintiffs complaint "relate[d] to" an employee benefit
plan, the causes fell under ERISA's express preemption clause.90
Since Pilot Life, the Supreme Court has limited the wide scope of
preemption. 9' The Court's reaction, in this respect, along with creative
lawyering by attorneys has allowed some state law tort claims to prevail on
their merits and avoid an ERISA preemption. This suggests that some
courts are beginning to look more closely at the process of managed care
decision-making, rather than simply following Pilot Life. Although state
law tort claims do undergo an ERISA challenge, if well-plead, they can
survive ERISA preemption. Specifically, this portion of the Article will
look at more recent cases that have withstood ERISA preemption.
In Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, a beneficiary of an HMO's ERISA health
plan and his wife brought an action against the HMO, hospital, and
individual defendants, alleging negligence and professional malpractice

83. Mariner, supra note 81.
84. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
85. Id. at 43.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 45.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 47.
91. Id. at 51 (noting that "in expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its
object and policy").
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claims.92 The District Court remanded the entire cause of action to the
Circuit Court and held that ERISA did not preempt the medical malpractice
claims against the HMO providing an ERISA plan, because the claims were
based on the HMO's contractual relationships with its participating doctors,
which allegedly resulted in medically negligent treatment of the plan
participant's child during birth. 93 Also, the court found that the connection
between the claims against the HMO and the plan were too remote to
warrant a finding that the state claims "related to" the plan.94 The holding
by this court reflected the Supreme Court's views in prior cases finding,
"[s]ome state actions may effect an employee benefit plan in 'too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral' a manner to warrant a finding that the state action
'relates to' the covered plan." 9'5
Likewise, in Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., a patient brought a
medical malpractice action against the physician and the HMO plan that
employed the physician.96 The HMO moved for summary judgment
alleging that the patient's action was preempted under ERISA.97 The
District Court found that a vicarious liability medical malpractice claim
against a HMO plan is not preempted by ERISA where the HMO plan
elects to directly provide medical services or leads participants to
reasonably believe that it has, rather than simply arranging and paying for
treatment. 9
The court reasoned that a vicarious liability medical malpractice action
based solely on substandard treatment is not an alternative action to collect
benefits, and does not interfere with calculation of benefits. 99 "Similarly, a
vicarious liability medical malpractice claim does not refer to and apply
solely to an ERISA plan, but rather, state law on this subject is tort law of
general application with an incidental effect on ERISA plans."'0o
92. Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669, 670 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
93. Id. at 672.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 671 (citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983)).
96. Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544, 546 (S.D. 111.
1994).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 548.
99. Id.
100. Id. See also Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, 719 N.E.2d 756, 766 (Ill.
1999) (reasoning that unless a patient who is a member of a HMO seeks care from a personal
physician, the patient is seeking care from the HMO itself and, accordingly, accepts that care
in reliance upon the HMO's holding itself out as the provider of care, as required for the
patient to impose vicarious liability on the HMO for a physician's medical malpractice under
an apparent authority theory). But cf. Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182
(E.D. Pa. 1994); Burke v. SmithKline Bio-Science Laboratories, 858 F. Supp. 1181 (M.D.
Fla. 1994); Paterno v. Albuerne, 855 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Independence HMO,
Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (rejecting ERISA preemption of medical
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The major dividing line, by now well known if not universally agreed
upon, is the distinction between causes of action that challenge coverage
decisions about the availability or quantity of insurance benefits and those
that challenge the quality of medical care. This quantity/quality distinction
was formulated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Dukes v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc.'1° In Dukes, plaintiffs filed suit in state court against
HMOs organized by the defendant, U.S. Healthcare, Inc., claiming damages
for injuries arising from the medical malpractice of HMO-affiliated
hospitals and medical personnel.' °2 The defendants removed both cases to
federal court, arguing (1) that the injured person in each case had obtained
medical care as a benefit from a welfare-benefit plan governed by ERISA,
(2) that removal was proper, and (3) that the plaintiffs' claims were
preempted.'03
The Third Circuit found that the claims brought by the representatives of
ERISA plan beneficiaries attacked the quality of the benefits they
received '04 The plaintiffs were not claiming that the plans erroneously
withheld benefits due, nor were they imploring the courts to enforce their
rights under the terms of their respective plans or to clarify their rights to
future benefits. 5 As a result, the plaintiffs' claims fell outside of the scope
of ERISA and were remanded to the state courts from which they were
removed.t'6
The Third Circuit has applied this reasoning in subsequent cases and
other circuits have followed it.0 7 Hence, the quality/quantity distinction
malpractice claims). But see Dukes v. U.S. Health Care Sys. of Pa., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39, 42
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding medical malpractice claim preempted because a determination of
ostensible agency necessitates examination of the plan to determine if the HMO held out the
physician in question as its agent, and therefore such claims 'relate to' the plan and are
preempted). See also Visconti by Visconti v. U.S. Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Pa.
1994); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Ricci v.
Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D. N.J. 1993); Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, Inc., 753 F.
Supp. 61 (D. Conn. 1990) (accepting ERISA preemption of medical malpractice claims).
101. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 530 U.S.
1242 (1995).
102. Id. at 351.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 357.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Ouellette v. Christ Hospital, 942 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (finding that
plaintiff's claims based upon respondeat superior or implied agency liability theories do not
rest upon the terms of the benefits plan, nor does resolution of her claims require the court to
construe the terms of her benefits plan; plaintiff's claim against health insurance provider
focuses upon the relationship between the health insurance provider and the hospital, not
between her and the health insurance provider; Plaintiff is not challenging the amount of
benefits but the quality of the services she received); Plocica v. Nylcare of Texas, Inc., 43 F.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol12/iss2/10

12

2003]

Mayers: The
The Bipartisan
PatientPatient
Protection
Act: GreaterAct
Liability on Manag
Bipartisan
Protection

creates a tort/contract distinction. Cases about the quality of care provided
can be brought as tort actions in state court, whereas cases about the
quantity of benefits may or may not be brought under ERISA as contract
claims for benefit denials.'O8
There is a more noticeable difference between delays in approving
benefit coverage and delays in approving specific treatment procedures,
providers, or facilities for medical conditions that are concededly covered.' °9
Approving benefit delays result from deciding whether or not a benefit is
covered at all, and it could be argued that a covered benefit is being denied
during the period of delay." ° The latter type of delay results from deciding
how to provide benefits or what quality of care to provide, and should not
be preempted by ERISA."'
If the delay from deciding whether a benefit is covered at all is a benefit
denial, then such a claim would be preempted because ERISA provides a
specific remedy for benefit denials." 2 However, if the benefits were
eventually provided, the patient would have no claim for denied benefits

Supp.2d 658 (N.D. Texas 1999) (holding that plaintiffs suing HMO and others were entitled
to have their motion to remand granted since their claims did not seek to recover payment or
reimbursement of any allegedly denied benefit, but were attacking quality of alleged medical
decision making, influence and control exercised by HMO and allegedly negligent acts in its
medical decisions, diagnosis, and treatment of patient); Stewart v. Berry Family Health
Center, 105 F. Supp.2d 807 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that patient suit against hospital,
physicians, and health insurer alleging that insurer's negligent establishment of financial
incentive programs to hospital impacted the quality of care she received from physicians was
not preempted; plaintiff's complaint was more properly characterized as challenging a
medical decision to deny proper treatment to a patient rather than an administrative decision
to deny benefits; in addition, because plaintiffs claim was based on the financial relationship
between health insurer and hospital, it did not rest upon the terms of the plan, and thus the
plan would not need to be construed in resolving the claim); Rice v._Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan of Texas, No. CIV.A.399CV0714L, 2000 WL 1449891, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
27, 2000) (stating that claims challenging the quality of a benefit are not preempted by
ERISA; claims arose solely under state law theories of negligence and medical malpractice
premised on inadequate health care decisions made); Carpenter v. Harris Community Health,
154 F. Supp.2d 928 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (finding the plaintiffs' claims did not challenge the
administration of or eligibility for benefits or otherwise rest upon the terms of the ERISA
plan; claims arose from the alleged inadequacy of the medical care that was provided);
Furstonberg v. Mintz, 170 F. Supp.2d 265 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (court stating that they did not
see a "quantity of care" claim masquerading as a "quality of care" claim; patient did not
challenge insurance company's utilization review procedure or any benefit determination
made by ERISA plan, and her claims arose from alleged negligent acts by physicians and
role of insurance company and others in those acts).
108. See Mariner, supra note 81.
109. Mariner, supra note 81, at 261.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
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under ERISA § 502(a)." 3 Practicing attorneys representing patients in
ERISA plans typically attempt to frame complaints to state causes of action
on the quality side of the line so that they are not preempted, while
plans attempt to reframe the cause of action
attorneys representing ERISA
4
preempted."
is
that
one
as
Major battles for managed care liability are being fought in the
courtroom and in lawyers' offices, where settlements are negotiated.'
However, in light of the few cases that go to trial, and the even smaller
number that result in appellate decisions, judicial decisions are not the best
means of influencing the content of laws affecting managed care. 1 6 As
several court decisions have noted, it is the responsibility of Congress and
the courts to decide whether to fill the gap in remedies in ERISA, and it
appears that some judges are inviting Congress to act. ' 7 So far, federal bills
have stalled, primarily due to competing views of whether and how to solve
the liability issue and this may continue to occur."8 However, Congress
cannot fend off legislation forever.'9
V. AMENDING ERISA

Congress attempted unsuccessfully in the last two terms to enact a law
that would amend ERISA and give individuals more legal recourse against
In January 1998, in his State of the
adverse health plan decision-making.
Union address, President Clinton spoke about a proposed Patients' Bill of

113. Id.
114. More specifically, defendants move to remove cases brought in state court to
federal court, typically on the grounds that the claim is really for the denial of benefits,
which is completely preempted, and must be brought in federal court as an ERISA § 502(a)
claim or not at all.
115. Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement out of the Shadows: Information About
Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality,48 UCLA L. REv. 663 (2001).
116. Mariner, supra note 81, at 266.
117. See, e.g., Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 282 (3d Cir. 2001)
("It is for Congress and not the courts to decide whether it is sound policy for our health care
system to limit or channel the relief available or whether ERISA should allow for broader
remedies for beneficiaries in the world of managed care").
118. See, e.g., Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R.
2723, 106th Cong. (1999), passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on Oct. 7, 1999; S.
889 (introduced by Senators Frist, Breaux, and Jeffords) and S. 283 (introduced by Senators
McCain, Kennedy, Chafee, Graham, and others), both named the Bipartisan Patient
Protection Act of 2001, 107th Congress, 1st Session, which were superseded by the Senate
and House bills passed in the summer of 2001.
119. See Karen A. Jordan, Coverage Denials in ERISA Plans: Assessing the Federal
Legislative Solution, 65 Mo. L. REv. 405 (2000).
120. David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What's Wrong With a PatientBill of
Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 221, 233 (2000).
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Rights that would cure some of the abuses associated with managed care.' 2'
This proposal was a result of a commission appointed by President Clinton
nearly ten months prior, which was formed to examine ways to protect
people in the health care market. 22 While the commission was unsure of
what type of legislation, if any, was needed, the President and members of
Congress were ready to generate legislative drafts. 2 1 Interestingly, neither
the Democrats nor the Republicans produced versions24 of the Patients' Bill
of Rights that resembled the commission's proposals.
The Democratic version extended the commission's consumer
protections, while the Republican version offered much narrower patient
protection. 12 During both the 105th and 106th Congress, Republican and
Democratic versions were proposed but not accepted by majorities in both
houses of Congress. 1 6 In July 1999, the Senate passed, by a vote of fiftythree to forty-seven, a Republican version that regulated HMOs and
insurance companies. In October of the same year, a broader Democratic
bill passed in the House by a vote of two hundred seventy-five to one
hundred fifty-one, with sixty-eight Republican votes.'28
Moreover, two Democrat senators, Edward Kennedy and Thomas
Daschle, introduced their own versions of a Patients' Bill of Rights Act on
September 15, 2000.' This legislation would have amended ERISA and
allowed state law claims for personal injury or wrongful death, which arise
from health care plan decisions that are currently preempted by ERISA. 3 °
The legislation further required that health care plans provide an
independent appeal mechanism outside the industry for those individuals
seeking to appeal a denial of benefits. 3 ' On November 3, 2000, Republican
Representative John Shadegg sponsored the Common Sense Patients' Bill
of Rights. 32 This legislation provided for an internal appeals mechanism,
but did not specifically abrogate the ERISA provisions that preempt certain

121. Tiffany F. Theodos, Note, The Patients' Bill of Rights: Women's Rights Under
Managed Care and ERISA Preemption, 26 AM. J. L. & MED. 89, 89 (2000).

122.
123.

Hyman, supra note 120, at 231.
Id. at 232.

124.
125.

Id. at 233.
Id.

126.

See Theodos, supra note 121, at 89.

127.
The 43rd President: What They Did; A Survey of the Voting Record of the 106th
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, at 48.
128. Id.

129.
130.
131.
132.

Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 2000, S. 3058.
Id. § 302(a).
Id. §§ 102, 301.
Common Sense Patients' Bill of Rights Act, H.R. 5628, 106th Cong. (2000).
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state law claims resulting from the denial of benefits.'33
There are valid concerns on both sides of the debate regarding to what
extent some version of the Patients' Bill of Rights should amend ERISA.
Managed care entities argue that health care costs will increase with the
corresponding increase in litigation that might arise when the ERISA shield
goes down. 3 4 Moreover, during the 106th Congress, Republicans talked
about small businesses that would no longer be able to afford health
insurance coverage, while Democrats presented daily stories that detailed
the horrors of the managed care system.1
35

VI. PATIENTS' BILL OF RIGHTS COMPARISON
A patients' bill of rights is a set of consumer-oriented managed care
rules. 36 According to the National Conference of State Legislature's Health
Policy Tracking Service, more than forty states have adopted some version
of a "patients' bill of rights." 117 These new laws address the entire range of
managed care issues, including, but not limited to: provider access, bans on
gag clauses, consumer grievance procedures, direct access, disclosure,
provider credentialing, medical records, insurer liability, solvency, drug
formularies, certification, and in some cases, a point-of-service option.1"8
The most contentious element in similar federal proposals is health plan
liability- whether people can sue their health plans, especially self-insured
plans. 3 9 Currently, ERISA limits liability of employer plans to the value of
services to be rendered. 4 ° Thus, if a person is denied a diagnostic
procedure and later suffers irreversible harm as a result of the denial, the
ERISA liability is limited to the cost of the procedure.'' Supporters of
creating greater liability say plans must be held to a standard of reasonable
care, rendering them liable for decisions that affect treatment. 142 Many
states have considered such policies, and as of late 2000, seven states have
enacted laws allowing residents to sue their health plans (three states used
133. Id. § 121.
134. Theodos, supra note 121, at 104-05. Despite this concern, only a few such
malpractice suits have been filed in Texas since the law was enacted. See Johnson, supra
note 76.
135. Hyman, supra note 120, at 237-38.
136. See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 9, at 8 (defining patients'
bill of rights and listing factual information according to states' adoption of some form of a
"patients' bill of rights").
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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other approaches to hold plans liable).'41 3 Twenty-three states also banned
"hold-harmless" clauses in contracts between plans and hospitals or
physicians, leaving plans responsible for services, but not creating a new
right to sue.'44
Opponents claim that the only group that will benefit from expanded
liability is trial lawyers.' 45 Thus, with the federal proposal, the pivotal issue
of legal accountability needs to be resolved by the conference committee
since there exists significant differences between the House and Senate
versions of the bill. Both bills, however, address ERISA preemption of
state tort claims against MCOs and would permit compensation for personal
injuries resulting from negligent benefit denials.' 6
The Senate and House bills create very different legal structures for
ERISA plan liability, with different implications both for federalism and the
applicability of ERISA. 147 Assuming ERISA continues to be applied to
health plans, there are three basic options for allocating jurisdiction over
liability, all of which require amending ERISA. 48 One option is to give
state law exclusive jurisdiction over all patient disputes with health plans by
ending ERISA preemption of state liability laws. 49 A second option is to
divide jurisdiction between the federal and state governments according to
the nature of the patient's claim, with claims based on medical judgments
allocated to state law, and claims based on contract requirements allocated
to federal law under ERISA. 5 ° The third option is to give federal law
exclusive jurisdiction over all such disputes and expand the remedies
beyond those currently available under ERISA to compensate patients for
personal injury. 5' The Senate
bill adopts the second option, while the
152
third.
the
adopts
bill
House
A. The Senate Bill
The Senate bill, if enacted, amends ERISA by allowing a participant or
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. The bills also include a variety of consumer protection provisions, including
standards for benefits offered by health insurance and managed care plans, disclosure of
information to patients, and procedures for internal and independent external review of
benefit decisions.
147. Mariner, supra note 81, at 268-69.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 269.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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beneficiary (or the estate of such participant or beneficiary) to bring federal
civil causes of action in cases not involving medically reviewable
decisions,'53 as well as ordinary state law claims for causes of action
involving medically reviewable decisions. 5 4 In order to assert a claim
under the federal civil remedy section, the benefit denial must be based on
administrative or contract requirements."' The persons that are subject to
suit under this section are a fiduciary of a group health plan, a health
insurance issuer offering health insurance coverage in connection with the
plan, or an agent of the plan, issuer, or plan sponsor.16 The claim must be
premised on contract principles. Additionally, in order for the plaintiff to
be awarded the economic and non-economic damages (not exemplary or
punitive damages) allowable, the persons subject to the suit must have
failed to exercise ordinary care in making a decision and such failure must
be a proximate cause of personal injury, or death of the participant or
beneficiary.'57
The Senate bill provides an exclusion of liability provision for
employers, other plan sponsors maintaining the plan, or employees of such

153. S. 1052, 107t Cong. § 402(a)(1) (2001) (adding new § 502(n)(2) to ERISA).
Medically reviewable decisions are defined within the bill as benefit denials based on: (1) a
determination that the item or service is not covered because it is not medically necessary
and appropriate or based on the application of substantially equivalent terms; (2) a
determination that the item or service is not covered because it is experimental or
investigational or based on the application of substantially equivalent terms; or (3) a
determination that the item or service or condition is not covered based on grounds that
require an evaluation of the medical facts by a health care professional in the specific case
involved to determine the coverage and extent of coverage of the item or service or
condition. Id. § 104(d)(2).
154. Id. §§ 402(a)(1) (adding new § 502(n)(17) to ERISA), § 402(b)(2) (adding new
subsection (d)(1)(A) to ERISA § 514).
155. Contract requirements involve those predicated on decisions (i) regarding whether
an item or service is covered under the terms and conditions of the plan or coverage; (ii)
regarding whether an individual is a participant or beneficiary who is enrolled under the
terms and conditions of the plan or coverage (including the applicability of any waiting
period under the plan or coverage), or (iii) as to the application of cost-sharing requirements
or the application of specific exclusion or express limitation on the amount, duration, or
scope of coverage of items and services under the terms and conditions of the plan or
coverage). Id. § 402(a)(1) (adding new § 502(n)(1) to ERISA).
156. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(1) to ERISA).
157. Id. The decision-making process falls under § 102 of S. 1052 (relating to
procedures for initial claims for benefits and prior authorization determinations) and § 103 of
S. 1052 (relating to internal appeal of a denial of a claim for benefits). Id. Ordinary care
means, with respect to a determination on a claim for benefits, that degree of care, skill, and
diligence that a reasonable and prudent individual would exercise in making a fair
determination on a claim for benefits of like kind to the claims involved. Id. (adding new §
502(n)(3) to ERISA). Personal Injury means a physical injury and includes an injury arising
out of the treatment (or failure to treat) a mental illness or disease). Id.
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employers or sponsors acting within the scope of employment.' 8 There is
an exception to this exclusion of liability, however, and a cause of action
may arise against the aforementioned groups if there was direct
participation by the employer, other plan sponsor, or employee in the
decision of the plan under section 102 or 103. '5 Direct participation is
defined in the bill and does not encompass any form of decision-making or
other conduct that is merely collateral or precedent to the decision on a
particular claim for benefits.' 60
A group health plan that is self-insured and self-administered by an

employer, including an employee of such an employer acting within the
scope of employment, or a multi-employer plan, including an employee of a
contributing employer of the plan, or a fiduciary of the plan, acting within
the scope of employment or fiduciary responsibility, that is self-insured and

self-administered are not liable for failing to perform any non-medically
reviewable duty under the plan.16 '
Likewise, no hospitals, treating
physicians or other treating health care professionals of the participant or
beneficiary, and no person acting under the direction of such a physician or
health care professional, can be found liable under the federal civil remedy
section for performing or failing to perform any non-medically reviewable
duty of the plan.' 62 Also, health insurance agents are not liable under the
federal civil remedy section when their sole involvement with the group
health plan is to provide advice or administrative services to employers or
other plan sponsors relating to the selection of health insurance coverage.163

158. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(5)(A) to ERISA).
159. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(5)(B) to ERISA); Id. §§ 102-103 (relating to procedures
for initial claims for benefits and prior authorization determinations) and (relating to internal
appeal of a denial of a claim for benefits).
160. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(5)(C) to ERISA). Direct participation means in
connection with a decision described in the federal civil remedy section, the actual making
of such decision or the actual exercise of control in making such decision. Id. Also, in any
case in which there is deemed to a designated decision-maker, all liability of such employer
or plan sponsor (and any employee thereof acting within the scope of employment) shall be
transferred to, and assumed by, the designated decision-maker and with respect to such
liability, the designated decision-maker shall be substituted for the employer or plan sponsor
(or employee) in the action and may not raise any defense that the employer or plan sponsor
(or employee) could not raise if such a decision-maker were not so deemed. Id. § 402(a)(1)
(adding new § 502(n)(18) to ERISA). A health insurance issuer shall be deemed to be a
designated decision-maker for purposes of a denial of administrative or contract benefits,
whether or not the employer or plan sponsor makes such a designation, and shall be deemed
to have assumed unconditionally all liability of the employer or plan sponsor under such
designation, unless the employer or plan sponsor affirmatively enter into a contract to
prevent the service of the designated decision-maker. Id.
161. Id. § 402(a)(1) (adding new § 502(n)(5)(D) to ERISA).
162. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(6) and (7) to ERISA).
163. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(16) to ERISA).
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This is a general application, however, and liability (whether direct or
vicarious) of the plan, the plan sponsor, or any health insurance issuer
offering coverage in connection with the plan is not limited.'"
The Senate bill contains an exhaustion of administrative processes
provision maintaining that a cause of action may not be brought under the
federal civil remedy section until all administrative processes under sections
102 and 103 have been exhausted. 65 This requirement may be excepted,
and a participant or beneficiary may seek relief exclusively in federal court
prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies if it is demonstrated to
the court that the exhaustion of such remedies would cause irreparable harm
to the health of the participant or beneficiary.' 66 Also, any determination
made by a reviewer in an administrative proceeding under section 103 is
admissible in67 any federal court proceeding and shall be presented to the

trier of fact.1

The Senate bill also states that a cause of action does not arise under the
federal civil remedy section where the denial involved relates to an item or
service already fully provided to the participant or beneficiary under the
plan or coverage, and the claim relates solely to the subsequent denial of
payment for the provision of such item or service.' 6' This language is not
construed to prohibit a cause of action under the federal civil remedy
section where the nonpayment involved results in the participant or
beneficiary being unable to receive further items or services that are directly
related to the item or service involved in the denial referred to under the
administrative or contract requirements, or that are part of a continuing
treatment or series of procedures.169 Also, this language does not prohibit or
limit a cause of action under the federal civil remedy section relating to
quality of care or liability that would otherwise arise from the provision of
the item or services or the performance of a medical procedure.'
One of the major disparities between the Senate bill and the House bill is
that the Senate bill permits an assessment of civil penalties.' 7 ' Under the
Senate bill, not only are participants and beneficiaries (or the estate of such
participants or beneficiaries) entitled to the remedies provided under the
federal civil remedy section (relating to the failure to provide contract
benefits in accordance with the plan), but they also are allowed to recover a
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(adding
(adding
(adding
(adding
(adding
(adding

new
new
new
new
new
new

§
§
§
§
§
§

502(n)(8) to ERISA).
502(n)(9)(A) to ERISA).
502(n)(9)(B) to ERISA).
502(n)(9)(D) to ERISA).
502(n)(19)(A) to ERISA).
502(n)(19)(B) to ERISA).

(adding new § 502(n)(10)(B) to ERISA).
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civil assessment, in an amount not to exceed five million dollars.'
The
claimant, in order to receive this assessment, however, must establish by
clear and convincing evidence that the alleged conduct carried out by the
defendant demonstrated bad faith and flagrant disregard for the rights of the
participant or beneficiary under the plan. In addition, the claimant must
establish that the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the personal
injury or death that is the subject of the claim.17 Accordingly, a statute of
limitation for 74claimants bringing actions under the federal civil remedy
section exists.'
Just as the Senate bill authorizes a federal civil remedy cause of action
for cases not involving medically reviewable decisions, it also authorizes an
ordinary state law cause of action for some cases involving medically
reviewable decisions. '
Hence, a claimant can receive damages for
personal injury or wrongful death if the cause of action arises under a
medically reviewable decision. 7 6 However, a limitation on punitive
damages with respect to a cause of action involving a medically reviewable
decision is found in this bill.'77

This general limitation is not warranted with respect to an action for
wrongful death if the applicable state law provides for damages in such an
action that are only punitive or exemplary in nature. 17 Also, state law is not
superseded with respect to any cause of action for personal injury or
wrongful death if, in such action, the plaintiff establishes by clear and

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(12) to ERISA). The federal civil remedy section shall not
apply in connection with any action commenced after three years after the later of: (a) the
date on which the plaintiff first knew, or reasonably should have known, of the personal
injury or death resulting from the failure described in the administrative and contract benefits
denial provisions, or (b) the date as of which the requirements for exhausting administrative
processes are first met. Id. The statute of limitations for any cause of action arising under
state law relating to a denial of a claim for benefits that is the subject of an action brought in
federal court shall be tolled under certain conditions. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(13) to
ERISA).
175. S. 1052, § 402(b)(2) (2001) (adding new subsection (d)(l)(A) to ERISA § 514).
This particular subsection is not construed to supersede or otherwise alter, amend, modify,
invalidate, or impair any cause of action under State law of a participant or beneficiary under
a group health plan (or the estate of such a participant or beneficiary) to recover damages
resulting from personal injury or for wrongful death against any person if such cause of
action arises by reason of a medically reviewable decision. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (adding new subsection (d)(1)(C)(i) to ERISA § 514). Senate bill provides State
law is superseded insofar as it provides any punitive, exemplary, or similar damages if, as of
the time of the personal injury or death, all the requirements of sections 102, 103, and 104
were satisfied. Id. § 104 (relating to independent external appeals procedures).
178. Id. (adding new subsection (d)(1)(C)(ii) to ERISA § 514).
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convincing evidence that conduct carried out by the defendant with willful
or wanton disregard for the rights or safety of others was a proximate cause
of the personal injury or wrongful death that is the subject of the action. 9
Just as the federal civil remedy section excludes liability from attaching
to employers and plan sponsors, likewise, the ordinary state law cause of
action section states that non-preemption does not apply to any cause of
action against an employer, or other plan sponsor maintaining the plan, or
against an employee of such an employer or sponsor acting within the scope
of employment. In addition, non-preemption does not apply to a right of
recovery, indemnity, or contribution by a person against an employer or
other plan sponsor (or such an employee) for damages assessed against the
180
person.
Additionally, the state law cause of action section is analogous to the
federal civil remedy cause of action section.' 8 ' A cause of action brought
under the state law cause of action section is governed by the law
(including
82
choice of law rules) of the state in which the plaintiff resides.'

B. The House Bill
There are some vast distinctions between the House bill and the Senate
bill. The differences in language as well as the resounding effects of the
remedies provided to participants and beneficiaries are noticeable.
If the House bill is enacted, it will amend ERISA by allowing for causes
of action relating to health benefits.'83 A participant or beneficiary (or the
179. Id. (adding new subsection (d)(1)(C)(iii) to ERISA § 514). Personal injury, defined
in Id. § 402(a)(1) (2001) (adding new subsection (n)(4)(B) to ERISA § 502).
180. S. 1052, § 402(b)(2) (2001) (adding new subsection (d)(3)(A) to ERISA § 514).
However, non-preemption does apply to any cause of action that is brought by a participant
or beneficiary under a group health plan (or the estate of such a participant or beneficiary) to
recover damages resulting from personal injury or for wrongful death against any employer,
or other plan sponsor maintaining the plan, or against an employee of such an employer or
sponsor acting within the scope of employment, if such cause of action arises by reason of a
medically reviewable decision.
181. Id. (adding new subsection (d)(1)(A) to ERISA § 514). There is a provision
holding employers or plan sponsors not liable for direct participation if their decision making
or other conduct is merely collateral or precedent to a decision regarding medically
reviewable decisions. (Adding new subsection (d)(3)(C)(i) to ERISA § 514). Any
determination made by a reviewer in an administrative proceeding under section 104 shall be
admissible in any federal or state court proceeding and shall be presented to the trier of fact.
(Adding new subsection (d)(4)(F) to ERISA § 514). There is the tolling provision stating
that the statute of limitations for any cause of action arising under § 502(n) relating to a
denial of a claim for benefits that is the subject of an action brought in state court shall be
tolled. (Adding new subsection (d)(5) to ERISA § 514).
182. Id. (adding new subsection (d)(12) to ERISA § 514).
183. H.R. 2563, 107" Cong. § 402(a) (2001) (adding new § 502 (n)(l)(A) to ERISA).
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estate of the participant or beneficiary) may commence these causes of
action.' 84 The person that is subject to suit is the designated decisionmaker.'85 The plan sponsor or named fiduciary of a group health plan is
given the authority to appoint a person as a designated decision-maker. 186
There are two exceptions to this vested authority.'87
In the case of a group health plan that provides benefits consisting of
medical care to a participant or beneficiary only through health insurance
coverage offered by a health insurance issuer, such issuer is the only entity
that may be qualified to serve as a designated decision-maker, and it shall
serve as such unless the employer or other plan sponsor acts affirmatively
to prevent such service.'
This issuer must also assume, unconditionally,
the exclusive authority under the group health plan to make determinations
on claims for benefits (irrespective
of whether they constitute medically
89
reviewable determinations).
The House bill provides that a claim under a group health plan may be
alleged only if a designated decision-maker failed to exercise ordinary
'90
in making a determination denying a claim for benefits under section
503A,' 9' in making a determination denying a claim for benefits under
section 503B, 92 or in failing to authorize coverage in compliance with the
written determination of an independent medical reviewer that reverses a
determination denying the claim for benefits.' 93 The delay in receiving, or
failure to receive, benefits attributable to the failure must be the proximate95
cause of personal injury 194 to, or death of, the participant or beneficiary.'
Such a designated decision-maker shall be liable to the participant or
184. Id.
185. Id. (adding new § 502 (n)(2) to ERISA).
186. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(2)(A)(i) to ERISA).
187. Id.
188. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(2)(C)(ii) to ERISA).
189. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(2)(B)(ii)(ILI) to ERISA).
190. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(l)(A)(i) to ERISA). Ordinary care means, with respect to
a determination on a claim for benefits, that degree of care, skill, and diligence that a
reasonable and prudent individual would exercise in making a fair determination on a claim
for benefits of like kind to the claims involved. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(16) to ERISA).
191. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(1)(A)(i)(I) to ERISA). Procedures for initial claims for
benefits and prior authorization determinations.
192. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(1)(A)(i)(II) to ERISA). Internal appeals of claims denials.
193. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(1)(A)(i)(III) to ERISA).
194. Id. (adding new § 502(n)(1)(A)(ii) to ERISA). Personal Injury means a physical
injury and includes an injury arising out of the treatment (or failure to treat) a mental illness
or disease). Id. (adding new § 502(n)(16)(f) to ERISA).
195. Id. (adding new § 502 (n)(1)(A)(ii) to ERISA). The House bill changes one word
in the causation language; thus, the Bush-Norwood amendment eliminates virtually all
patients' claims. Id. Designated decision-makers' refusal of benefits have to be "the,"
rather than (as in the original legislation) "a," proximate cause of the injury or death. Id.
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beneficiary (or the estate) for economic and non-economic damages in
connection with such failure and such injury, or death (subject to some
limitations on recovery of damages). 96
If a cause of action is brought under a determination denying a claim for
benefits under section 503A, or under a determination denying a claim for
benefits under section 503B, this bill states, if an independent medical
reviewer under section 503C 197 upholds the determination denying the claim
for benefits involved, there shall be a presumption (rebuttable by clear and
convincing evidence) that the designated decision-maker exercised ordinary
care in making such determination. ' "
Similar to the Senate bill, the House bill contains an exhaustion of
remedies provision.
Similar to the Senate bill, the House bill contains an exhaustion of
remedies provision. Also, under this bill, a participant or beneficiary may
seek injunctive relief prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies
under section 503B or 503C if it is demonstrated that the exhaustion of such
remedies would cause irreparable harm to the health of the participant or
beneficiary.' 99
The limitations on the amount of recovery damages provision, in the
House bill, proclaims that the aggregate amount of liability for noneconomic loss under a claim for health benefit denials may not exceed one
and a half million dollars.2°° Furthermore, with a claim for health benefit
denials, the court may not award any punitive, exemplary, or similar
damages against a defendant, except that the court may award punitive,
exemplary, or similar damages (in addition to the non-economic loss
damages), in an aggregate amount not to exceed one and a half million
dollars.20 ' There is a caveat attached to the punitive damage language that
states that this aggregate amount can only be awarded if the denial of a
claim for benefits was reversed pursuant to a written determination by an
independent medical reviewer and there has been a failure to authorize
coverage incompliance with such written determination. 20,
The House bill allows a State to limit damages for non-economic loss or

196.
197.
198.
bill.
199.
standard
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id. (adding new § 502(n)(1)(B) to ERISA).
Id. Note that this rebuttable presumption language is not expressed in the Senate
Id. (adding new § 502 (n)(3)(B) to ERISA). A preponderance of the evidence
is not found in the Senate bill.
H.R. 2563, § 402(a) (2001) (adding new § 502 (n)(4)(A) to ERISA).
Id. (adding new § 502 (n)(4)(B) to ERISA).
Id.
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similar damages to amounts less than the amounts permitted by their bill.20 3
The statute of limitations provided by the bill states that a claim for health
benefit denials is inapplicable in connection with any action that is
commenced more than five years after the date on which the failure
occurred or, if earlier, not later than two years after the first date the
participant or beneficiary became aware of the personal injury or death.2 °'
This bill provides that a claim or cause of action may not be maintained as a
class action, as a derivative action, or as an action on behalf of any group of
two or more claimants. 25 Furthermore, a civil action brought in any State
court against any party (other than the employer, plan, plan sponsor, or
other entity) arising from a medically reviewable determination may not be
removed to any district court of the United States. 2 6
VII. CONCLUSION
Analysis of the two bills indicates that the Senate bill places greater
liability on managed care plans. The Senate bill accomplishes this by
allowing a claimant to bring an action against a plan in federal court, if the
underlying cause of action involves a non-medically reviewable (contract or
administrative) decision.0 7 Conversely, it permits suits to be brought in
State court if the underlying cause of action engages a medically reviewable
decision.00 The Senate bill, therefore, grants plaintiffs greater access to sue
managed care plans. Furthermore, the Senate bill allows for punitive
damages in cases involving medically reviewable claims, and provides a
"civil penalty assessment" of up to five million in federal cases. 1 9
On the other hand, under the House bill, plaintiffs cannot hold managed
care plans accountable under state law."0 Actions are still only available in
federal court and would be subject to numerous statutory restrictions,
including a one and a half million-dollar cap on non-economic damages.
Punitive damages are also capped at one and a half million-dollars, and
States with even more restrictive terms may apply them.

203. Id. (adding new § 502 (n)(4)(C) to ERISA).
204. Id. (adding new § 502 (n)(7) to ERISA).
205. Id. (adding new § 502 (n)(12) to ERISA).
206. Id. § 402(b)(2) (adding new § 502 (e)(1) to ERISA). Note that the Senate bill
allows suits in State courts for medically reviewable decisions even if it involves an
employer, plan sponsor, etc., as long as there was direct participation.
207. See supra notes 153-155 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of the
Senate bill).
208. See supra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 171.
210. H.R. 2563, § 402(b)(2) (2001) (adding new § 502 (e)(l) to ERISA).
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